We draw on the experience of the major combatant countries in World War I to analyse the role of economic factors in determining the outcome of the war and the effects of the war on subsequent economic performance. We demonstrate that the degree of mobilisation for war can be explained largely by differences in the level of development of each country, leaving little room for other factors that feature prominently in narrative accounts, such as national differences in war preparations, war leadership, military organisation and morale. We analyse the effects of the war on subsequent economic performance in terms of the scale of destruction of physical and human capital. Although the growth rate between 1918 and 1929 was highest in the economies which experienced the worst destruction, over the period 1913-1929 as a whole, per capita income growth in Europe was reduced. Thus there was some rebound, but not enough to undo the negative effects of the capital destruction and the damage to the international institutional framework caused by the war.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been little quantitative economic analysis of World War I, and even less that uses a systematic comparative framework. Although some quantitative work was conducted at the end of the war under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, most of this was organised around individual economies, with only the study by Bogart (1920) taking a systematic comparative approach.
Subsequent comparative work was either narrowly focused on specific themes such as public finance (Fisk, 1924; Mendershausen, 1941) or has tended to be rather less systematically quantitative or economic (Hardach, 1977; Chickering and Förster, 2000) . To some extent, previous generations of scholars could point to data problems as an excuse for not adopting a comparative quantitative approach to the economics of World War I; the increasing availability of historical national accounts for the major combatant countries, however, makes this argument no longer sustainable.
In this paper, we draw on the experience of the major combatant countries to examine the economics of World War I. There was a circle of causation linking total war and economics, which we decompose into its two halves.
First, we examine the role of economic factors in determining the outcome of the war. As with our analysis of World War II (Harrison, 1998) , we argue that the size of national resources mattered greatly, but that size was not everything: the quality of the economy, or its level of development, was also important. The resources of rich countries were more available for mobilization than the resources of poor countries. If poor countries tended to get four when they added two and two, rich countries usually got more. We demonstrate that the degree of mobilisation for war can be explained largely by differences in the level of development of each country; in other words, the level of development acted as a multiplier of size. This also leaves little room for other factors that feature prominently in most narrative accounts, such as national differences in war preparations, war leadership, military organisation and morale.
Second, we examine the effects of World War I on subsequent economic performance. Here, we quantify the scale of destruction of physical and human capital and examine the implications for national balance sheets. Although the growth rate between 1918 and 1929 was highest in the economies which experience the worst destruction, over the period 1913-1929 as a whole, per capita income growth in Europe as a whole was reduced. Thus there was some rebound, but not enough to undo the negative effects of the capital destruction and damage to the international institutional framework caused by the war.
II. WHY THE ALLIES WON
What did economic factors contribute to victory and defeat in World War I? Before the event, so to speak, the answer should have been nothing; after the event, it turned out to be nearly everything. From the standpoint of the German war plan for 1914, economic factors were not expected to count. The German general staff hoped for victory in the west within six weeks. The war was intended to be won by military, not economic means, and was to be finished off long before economic factors could be brought into play. It was only after this plan had failed, as the leaders on each side contemplated the ensuing stalemate, that belts began to be tightened and sleeves rolled up for the mobilisation of entire economies (Chickering and Förster, 2000) .
Once plans were redrawn for a longer haul, a war of attrition developed in the west where the opposing forces of Germany, France, and Britain, each backed by large, rich, and successful economies, ground each other down with rising force levels and rising losses. In battles that were intended to be won by the last man left standing, resources counted for almost everything. Once the German military advantage had failed to win an immediate victory in the west, it seems inevitable that the greater Allied capacity for taking risks, absorbing the cost of mistakes, replacing losses, and accumulating overwhelming quantitative superiority should eventually have turned the balance against Germany.
The realization of this advantage took time, which seems to have misled Ferguson (1998: 248-81 ) into writing about an "advantage squandered". However, there is simply no need to conclude that "the Germans were significantly better at mobilizing their economy for war than the Western powers" just because the war had not ended by the winter of 1916-17 (Ferguson, 1998: 256-257) . Total war is, by definition, a drawn out affair. Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Near East formed the theatre of combat for the economically weaker powers: Russia, Italy, and the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. The British and Germans wished to be more involved there, but neither could withdraw significant forces from the western front. In the east, therefore, the immediate outcomes of battles were less determined by economic factors, at least in the short run. Over a period of years, however, the battles drained the weakest economy first, and this led to Russia's exit from the war in 1917. Then, the Central Powers' chance for victory in the east was destroyed by Germany's defeat in the west.
The economic advantage of the Allies over the Central Powers was substantial at the outbreak of war and rose steadily as the composition of the belligerents changed on each side. The most striking change was that during 1917 Russia was defeated and abandoned the Allies, but was replaced by the United States. Thus the richest great power stepped into the gap left by the poorest, and this led to a further increase in the Allied advantage.
1 In some ultimate sense economic advantage did determine the outcome, but only after much time had passed and purely military advantage had failed to win the day.
Size and Development
What were the resources that were deployed on either side in the war? These are best measured by adding up the populations, territories, and gross domestic products of the territories at war. Populations limited the numbers of men and women available in each country for military service or war work. Territories limited the breadth and variety of natural resources available for agriculture and mining; the wider the territory, the more varied were the soil types and the minerals beneath the soil. GDPs limited the volume of weapons, machinery, fuel, and rations that could be made available to arm and feed the soldiers and sailors on the fighting front. The larger the population, territory, and GDP of a country, the easier it would be for that country to overwhelm the armed forces of an adversary.
In adding up the resources available to each country we also compute the territories and income available per head of the population. Most important was average GDP per head, which reflected the country's development level. A poor country might have a large population, but if most of the adults were engaged in lowproductivity subsistence farming then there would be little real possibility of transferring many of them out of agriculture to the armed forces or war industry since the remaining farmers would be unable to produce enough food to keep everyone alive. Equally, a poor country might have a large territory but, without a high level of development of roads and railways, would be unable to exploit it economically or defend it militarily. Finally, a poor country typically lacked efficient government and financial services of the kind necessary to account for resources and direct them into national priorities. Thus, a relatively high level of economic development was essential if territory and population were to count in war. The bare totals on the Allied side do not give any idea of their heterogeneity. The British empire will do for illustration since it comprised some of the richest and poorest regions in the world. Britain itself had a prewar population of 46 million with an average income per head of nearly $5,000 (at 1990 prices). Its colonies, excluding the Dominions, had a prewar population of 380 millions, mostly Indians, with an average income of less than $700. Thus a colonial population eight times that of Britain produced a similar volume of output. Moreover this output was far less available than Britain's for fighting Germany for three reasons: it was hundreds or thousands of miles away from the theatre of war, the level of development of colonial government administration and financial services rendered it hard to track and control, and most of it was already committed to the subsistence needs of the colonial populations. In short, the mere possession of low income territories was of little value to a great power in the war. If India helped Britain in the war it was to enable British trade and commerce rather than because Britain could mobilise Indian resources in any meaningful sense. And the trade that really mattered to the British economy in the war was with rich America and Canada, not with poor India. The force of these changes is felt even more strongly when it is remembered that the figures in Table 3 are based on the assumption that in wartime the real output of a given territory did not change. While we cannot track the changes for more than a few countries, the figures available suggest further substantial swings which worked primarily to favour the richer powers, Britain and America. Table 4 
Allied Superiority

The Human Factor
Where, in all this, is there room for factors other than the economic ones? Reviewing our previous work on World War II (Harrison, 1998 ) the historian Richard Overy (1998) objected that we left no role to "a whole series of contingent factors -moral, political, technical, and organisational -[that] worked to a greater or lesser degree on national war efforts." Such factors were clearly significant in World War I, and economists have considered why they must matter in principle (Brennan and Tullock, 1982 ) but we do not apologise for still giving most weight to the quantities of resources.
At first the two sides were unequal in military and civilian organisation, motivation, and morale. Germany entered the war with first-rate military advantages associated with "the most formidable army in the world" (Kennedy, 1988: 341) , past victories, and the exploitation of initial shock and rapid movement, and maintained this relative military edge throughout the war (Ferguson, 1998, 298-300) . But the effects of looming defeat electrified Britain and France, transformed public opinion, and forced their armies and governments through intensive courses in the new rules of warfare and mobilisation. This proved to be the pattern through the war: each temporary setback was followed by strenuous efforts to refine strategy and strengthen morale, organisation, and supplies, and these efforts generally succeeded within the limits permitted by the resources available to support them. In short, the "moral, political, technical, and organisational" issues of the war on each side were not independently variable factors but proved to be endogenous to the progress of the war.
Other things being held equal, a deficit of organisation or morale on one side tended to be overcome through a self-balancing process. The one thing that could not be overcome was a deficit of resources.
This approach is well illustrated by comparing the two offensives that appeared to
give Germany its best chances of winning the war: August 1914 and March 1918. In the first of these Germany planned to exploit mass, movement, and surprise to destroy into reorganisation; the Americans had to accept a unified command. Resources defeated the advancing Germans: their own lack of supply, for they were badly clothed and undernourished even before they began their advance; the abundance of supplies they found in the Allied trenches that caused many to turn away from the attack to eat and drink their advantages away (Herwig, 1988: 102) ; and the superabundance of war materials that enabled the Allies to regroup and go on to inflict a far greater defeat on the exhausted enemy.
III. MOBILISATION AND THE LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT
Four Aspects of Mobilisation
In this section we examine production mobilisation (the wartime increase in real GDP), fiscal mobilisation (the wartime transfer of resources into the hands of government), military mobilisation (the wartime transfer of persons into the armed forces), and the capital-intensity of warfare (the flow ratio of weapons produced to years of combat service). We find that the comparative success of the various economies in mobilising their resources depended largely on their level of economic development. In some aspects this relationship is found only after controlling for the confounding influences of combat duration and proximity. Britain and the United
States were both rich and highly developed, for example, but the briefer involvement of the United States in the war and its greater distance from the continental theatre of warfare inevitably weakened some of the mobilising impulses felt there. A warning about selection bias may also be in order: poorer countries had less good government and national accounts, so the data reported by richer countries tends to be overrepresented; we also have less confidence in the data of the poorer countries when it is reported. it is necessary to control for distance for the relationship to become apparent. The measure that we use tends to underestimate the richer countries' ability to transfer resources rapidly from peacetime to wartime uses since they also tended to spend a lower proportion of their national income on defence in peacetime (Eloranta, 2003) . It is not clear whether the association suggested by Figure 2 would be strengthened by inclusion of the Ottoman Empire where the proportion of GDP under the control of the state was no more than 16-20 per cent at the peak (Pamuk, 2005) . With regard to fiscal mobilisation Figure 2 is our best shot: after the first year of warfare, any relationship between fiscal mobilisation and development level ceases to be apparent.
Men and weapons may provide more unambiguous measures of mobilisation than money. In the mobilisation of young men we find a pattern that again rises with development and falls with distance. Figure The richer countries were not only able to mobilise more men. Regardless of distance, they also supplied them better. Capital-abundant economies were able to support capital-intensive warfare. Figure 4 plots cumulative war production of rifles, machine guns, field guns, tanks, and aircraft in units per thousand men mobilised through the war and per year of the war. In each case we see that supply rose strongly with the development level of the country.
To summarise, size mattered for the ability of a country to supply the means of military power, but the level of economic development was a multiplier of size.
Richer countries were able to mobilise production, public finance, soldiers, and weapons per soldier, out of proportion to their general economic capacities.
Mobilisation and Agriculture
Countries like Russia and Austria-Hungary were large; why did it make such a difference that they were also poor? We could imagine the relationship between mobilisation and economic development operating through several possible channels.
A pure income effect is one candidate. Another candidate is the effect of economic development on the general quality of legal and financial institutions, that might support more efficient wartime administration and a wider capital market to support wartime deficit finance. A third effect, on which we concentrate here, is the effect of economic development on the economic structure: in World War I, poor countries ran short of food long before they ran out of guns and shells (Offer, 1989) , and we associate this with a negative influence of peasant agriculture on mobilisation.
One of the most striking attributes of relative poverty was the role of subsistence farming. Contemporary observers were aware of these differences and interpreted them as follows: when war broke out, a country such as Russia would have an immediate advantage in the fact that most of its population could feed itself; moreover, the ability to divert food supplies from export to the home market would actually increase Russia's advantage. In contrast Britain would quickly starve (Gatrell and Harrison, 1993) . This diagnosis could not have been more wrong. In practice the presence of a large peasantry proved to be a great disadvantage when it came to the mobilisation of resources for war. Peasant agriculture behaved very much like a neutral trading partner. Why should Netherlands trade with Germany given the latter's reduced ability to pay, except under threat of invasion and confiscation? Peasant farmers made the same calculation. Thus the Russian economy looked large, but if the observers of the time had first subtracted its peasant population and farming resources they would have seen how small and weak Russia really was. Meyendorff (cited by Gatrell, 2005) described what happened in Russia as "the Russian peasant's secession from the economic fabric of the nation". And not only from Russia, for Italy, AustriaHungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Germany all had large peasant populations that proved extremely difficult to mobilise for much the same reason.
The common process of the peasant's secession is clearly visible from a comparison of the richer and poorer countries' experience. When war broke out British and American farmers boosted production because they were offered higher prices and responded normally to incentives. The fact that British farming had already contracted to a small part of the economy made its expansion easier: there were plentiful reserves of land unused or little exploited, and the high productivity of farm labour meant that substantial increases in farm output could be achieved with relatively little extra in the way of resources.
In the poorer countries, in contrast, wartime mobilisation began by taking resources away from farming, particularly young men and horses for the army. Once in the army these young men and horses still needed to be fed, of course, which implied a diversion of food supplies from rural households to government purchasers.
But at the same time the motivation for farmers in the countryside to sell food was greatly reduced. These were subsistence farmers who grew food partly for their own consumption; what they sold, they took to the market primarily to buy the manufactured commodities, mainly textiles and metal goods, that they needed for their families. But war dried up the supply of manufactures to the countryside. The small industrial sectors of the poorer countries were soon wholly concentrated on supplying the army with weapons and equipment, uniforms and rations. There was no capacity left to supply the countryside, which faced a steep decline in supplies.
Consequently, peasant farmers retreated into subsistence activities. As the market supply of food dried up, in the towns food prices soared.
The economy began literally to disintegrate: there might still be plenty of food, but it was in the wrong place. The farmers preferred to eat it themselves than sell it for a low return. The government had to feed the army at all costs for a simple reason: hungry soldiers will not fight. Between the army and the peasantry the urban workers were now caught in a double squeeze. There was still enough food for everyone to have enough to eat; the localised shortages that began to spread were famines that arose from the urban society's loss of entitlement (Sen, 1983; Offer, 1989) , not from the decline in aggregate availability.
Aware of the unequal distribution of food, public opinion might blame unpatriotic speculators or incompetent officials, but the truth was that a poor country had few real choices. The scope for policy to improve the situation was usually more apparent than real, and government action typically made things worse: for example the Russian, Austrian, and German governments all began to ration food to the urban population, while attempting to buy up food from the countryside at purchasing prices that were fixed low for budgetary reasons. To repeat: in richer countries the government paid more to the food producers, and this worked, but in poorer countries we will see that the government wanted to pay less and this had entirely predictable results. The willingness of farmers to participate in the market was still further undermined.
This process may be illustrated in a couple of diagrams. Figure 5 represents the urban-rural markets of two countries, one that we will style "Russia" and the other "Germany"; the difference between the two is that before 1914 Russia was a substantial net exporter of food, Germany a net importer. The figures use the offer curves that are conventionally used in international economics, but the market here is partly domestic in peacetime, and wholly domestic after the war virtually halted international trade. In both countries the farmers offer food along a curve FF and buy manufactures along the matching curve MM but in peacetime foreign buyers and sellers also intervene at the world terms of trade, T. Thus, in Panel A Russian farmers sell their food surplus partly at home, partly abroad; manufactured goods are offered partly by domestic industry along the MM curve and, when domestic marginal costs rise above the world price, by foreigners. A corresponding role is played in Panel B
by German industry, which sells partly at home and partly abroad, importing food when marginal costs along the domestic FF offer curve rise above the world price.
The upshot is that in both panels the rural offer is A at the world price T, while the urban offer is B, the difference being made up by exports and imports.
By implication, when the war cuts off foreign markets, the domestic equilibrium goes to C. The main adjustment is a fall in the availability of manufactures in Russia, where the terms of trade shift against the peasant. In Germany it is mainly food that becomes less available and the terms of trade facing the peasant improve. This is not the end of the story, however. Europe came from natural deposits overseas. The trade disruption associated with the war forced the development of a German industry to manufacture nitrates artificially, but these were costly and war needs took up the supply that was created (Lee, 1975) .
As a result the availability of nitrates for farming fell sharply in Germany, but the impact was less in Russia where the initial reliance on nitrates was less widespread.
The losses of human, animal, and chemical power combined to push the rural offer curve leftward to FF in both countries. This shift was limited, however, by the fact that young men and horses are consumers of food as well as producers. At the same time a decline in the availability of manufactures for rural consumption displaced the urban offer curve sharply downwards to MM . In Panel A we suppose for illustration that the MM downshift exceeded the leftward shift of FF because limited industrial capacity was greatly pre-empted by wartime mobilisation. A great market contraction followed, equilibrium adjustment leading both countries to D. In Germany the notional improvement in the peasants' terms of trade from economic isolation was counter-balanced by further movement to T . In Russia the peasants' terms of trade became doubly disadvantageous.
Finally, the government stepped in and tried to hold food prices down by enforcing a state price at T , creating excess demand and scope for a black market in each country. This is shown in Figure 6 , Panel B. To the extent that such controls were effective, the rural offer fell back to E although urban agents were willing to trade at G at the state enforced terms of trade. The EG gap reflected a matching unsatisfied demand for food and an excess supply of manufactures: the least privileged townspeople would be found in the markets trying to sell off their fabricated possessions for money that farmers would refuse to accept for their produce. To the extent that intervention failed, however, there was scope for black marketeers to step in and capture rents; as long as the rents were competed away production and consumption could both tend back to D but popular respect for law and government would inevitably suffer in the process.
Here we see why the outcome was potentially as bad for German consumers as for Russians, or worse. The Russians did indeed have their prewar export surplus to fall back on. Although a much richer nation than Russia, urban famine was as acute in Germany in the closing stages of the war.
Some readers may be surprised to find Germany numbered among the countries that suffered a decline in agricultural output during the war. Although pre-1914
Germany has entered the economic history textbooks as a developed economic power, it should be noted that its modernisation was highly unbalanced. High levels of productivity in heavy industry co-existed with much lower productivity in light industry, and much of the service sector was also characterised by low productivity, despite Gerschenkron's (1962) focus on the modernised railways and the universal banks (Broadberry, 1998) . But perhaps the most obvious sign of Germany's relative backwardness was the high share of the labour force engaged in low productivity agriculture. Germany paid a high price during the two world wars for protecting its agriculture in peacetime (Olson, 1963) .
In summary, to be poor when war broke out was to suffer the consequences of a peasant agriculture, which was essentially a dead weight on the mobilisation efforts of the country concerned. For this purpose we include Germany. The process that resulted had its inexorable conclusion in urban famine, revolutionary insurrection, and the downfall of emperors.
IV. EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON THE ECONOMY
We begin our analysis of the effects of the war on the economy by considering the Table 6 provides estimates of what Bogart (1920) labels "direct costs" of the war.
Bogart's Study of Direct and Indirect Costs
These costs are calculated as the flow of spending by governments on the prosecution of the war, i.e. spending over and above normal prewar levels. Inter-allied transfers are subtracted from gross expenditures to arrive at net costs, which show the heaviest burden to have been borne by Britain and Germany, with France, Russia and the United States also bearing a substantial net cost on the Allied side and AustriaHungary amongst the Central Powers. On a per capita basis, Britain, France and Germany stand out as bearing a much higher net cost than the other countries.
Nevertheless there are a number of disadvantages to the way that Bogart presents the data. First, it is inappropriate simply to add up nominal sums spent at different times, given the wartime inflation. Second, this problem, as well as the related problem of the conversion to dollars of all values expressed in national currencies can be avoided if the war expenditures are expressed as a proportion of national income in each year, as in Table 5 above. A number of accounting procedures here give cause for concern. Although the accounting for losses to physical capital is unremarkable (remembering that cargoes can be seen as inventories), the treatment of human capital requires some attention.
The capitalised value of human life, based simply on lifetime earnings, would overstate the social loss since people consume as well as produce. One way of arriving at the social loss is therefore to subtract consumption from lifetime earnings, as in the work of Clark (1931) . Obviously this is not an attempt to capture the loss of utility arising from war deaths, but merely treats people as human capital to be replaced like physical capital so as to maintain production. As Edelstein (2000: 349) points out "It is absurd to think the methods and perspectives of economic history can come anywhere near to comprehending the meaning of human losses from war. We are far better served by the speeches and letters of Lincoln or the poetry of Sassoon, Brooke, Owen, Graves and Seager." However, for symmetry with the treatment of physical capital on a replacement cost basis, the simplest procedure is to add up the cost of rearing and training a worker, since this is the net loss to society by premature death.
In Table 8 , Bogart simply adds the direct and indirect costs to arrive at a grand total. The justification for this is unclear, since it combines flows of current spending with changes in the stock of assets needed to generate those flows. To add to the confusion, lost production (a flow concept) is included as an indirect cost (a stock concept). Note also that some of the government spending on the war effort, which is included negatively as a direct cost by Bogart, should actually enter positively in the national balance sheet, contributing to intangible physical and human capital. To the extent that the war induced additional spending on health and welfare, this contributed to the accumulation of intangible human capital, while research expenditure on the development of weapons may have had spin-off effects on the accumulation of intangible physical capital. Finally, note that Bogart (1920: 299) makes no attempt to relate his estimates of the direct and indirect costs of World War I to levels of income or wealth, but simply concludes that "the figures presented in this summary are both incomprehensible and appalling". This is an issue which can be addressed in the national balance sheet approach.
Effects on National Balance Sheets
Broadberry and Howlett (1998) provide an accounting framework for evaluating the long run impact of war on wealth, which is based on national balance sheets. The first important distinction is between stocks and flows in the system of national accounts.
Issues concerned with the scale of mobilisation are best tackled by looking at flows of income, expenditure and output, and calculating the proportion of these flows that is devoted to the war effort, as in Table 5 . However, the long run impact of the war can best be assessed by looking at the effects on national wealth, defined here to include human as well as physical capital, intangible as well as tangible capital and net overseas assets (Goldsmith et al., 1963; Revell, 1967; Kendrick, 1976) .
Tangible physical capital is the conventional form of capital, consisting of buildings, equipment and inventories. Intangible physical capital is cumulated expenditure on research and development, which is seen as improving the quality of the tangible physical capital. Tangible human capital is the spending required to produce an uneducated, untrained worker, i.e. basic rearing costs. Intangible human capital is mainly spending on education and training to improve the quality of the human capital, although it also includes other items such as spending on health and safety and mobility costs. In an open economy, the impact of the war on net overseas assets must also be taken into account.
We believe that this accounting framework deals with the main objections raised by writers such as Hardach (1977: 286) and Milward (1984: 9-27 ) to previous attempts to quantify the impact of war on the economy. In particular, note that: (1) a clear distinction between stock and flow concepts is maintained throughout (2) all nominal values are converted to a constant price basis so that values for different years can be added together (3) human capital calculations take account of the fact that people consume as well as produce (4) the fact that postwar birth rates rise does not alter the fact that the human capital embodied in those killed by warfare is lost; this has a negative impact on national wealth as much as any destruction of physical capital, which is usually followed by increased investment to make good war losses (5) technological change stimulated by wartime research and development can be seen as having a positive impact on intangible physical capital (6) social spending stimulated by the war can be seen as having a positive impact on intangible human capital.
War Casualties and Human Capital Losses
One obvious cost of the war was the huge number of deaths resulting from the "industrialisation" of warfare, which led to the growing use of the term "total war" (Chickering and Förster, 2000) . There are conceptual difficulties with the types of death to be included in any definition of war deaths, which could be restricted to battle deaths of military personnel or broadened to include non-battle deaths of civilians as well as military personnel. We have opted for battle and non-battle deaths of military personnel, following Urlanis (1971) since this offers a high degree of uniformity in data across countries while going beyond those killed in battle or who died from wounds or poison gas. Non-battle deaths includes those who died from disease, died in captivity or died from accidents and other causes. We exclude most deaths in the influenza pandemic of 1918, however.
The data in Table 9 Turning these casualties into estimates of human capital losses in the national balance sheet framework requires knowledge of the prewar costs of rearing and educating a child, together with cohort-specific estimates of the education of the labour force. In the absence of sufficient data for many countries, the human capital losses in Table 10 are calculated as the ratio of war deaths to the prewar population of prime working age, taken from Urlanis (1971) . This differs from the proportion of human capital destroyed by the war to the extent that younger cohorts had more human capital investment, particularly through education. Also, since the human capital losses are not calculated in monetary units, they cannot be added to physical capital losses to provide an estimate of the proportion of physical and human capital destroyed by the war.
Physical Capital Losses and Changing National Wealth
Turning to physical capital losses in Table 10 , we have largely relied for the losses of domestic assets on Bogart's (1920) estimates of property losses on land and shipping and cargo losses from Table 7 . However, whereas Bogart (1920) expressed the losses in terms of US dollars, we have expressed them as percentages of prewar capital.
France's losses were extremely heavy when expressed as a percentage of prewar capital in Table 10 , as well as in dollar terms in Table 7 . 6 Russia's losses appear rather heavier in proportionate terms than in absolute dollar values, due to the low level of Russia's prewar capital stock. Also in Table 10 , for some countries it has been possible to obtain estimates of the change in overseas assets and national wealth. In the case of Britain, nearly a quarter of overseas investments were liquidated during the war, so that the reduction of national wealth was proportionally much greater than the loss of physical capital. For France, although the loss of overseas assets was proportionally higher due to heavy exposure to Russian loans, the share of physical capital losses was also much higher than in Britain (Hardach, 1977: 289-290) . Hence the share of national wealth lost in the war was about the same as the share of physical capital lost.
In principle, some of the government spending on the war effort, which is included negatively as a direct cost by Bogart (1920) should actually enter positively in the national balance sheet, contributing to intangible physical capital in the form of cumulated research and development spending and to intangible human capital in the form of spending on health and mobility. However, in practice, Broadberry and Howlett (1998) found that these effects were very small even during World War II.
During World War I, these positive effects were difficult to discern at all in the British case. Such effects were unlikely to have been of much more significance for other countries.
Reparations and National Wealth
Finally in Table 10 , we have added in Germany's reparations bill as a proportion of prewar capital, since they represented an increase in overseas liabilities and hence a reduction in national wealth just as much as the liquidation of Britain's overseas assets meant a reduction in national wealth. Of course there is a huge debate over the extent to which Germany actually had to pay these reparations, but that does not alter the effect on the national balance sheet as it stood immediately after the Treaty of Versailles (Ritschl, 2003) . These figures include the A+B+C Bonds, which added up to a total of 132 billion Gold Marks. Milward (1984: 15-16 ) is critical of studies that focus on the costs of the war, which he sees as neglecting the wider impact of the war on growth and development. This reflects a substantial literature arguing that the two world wars stimulated economic and social changes which had positive as well as negative effects (Andrzejewski, 1954; Titmuss, 1950) . However, there are good grounds to be sceptical here. Milward (1984: 17-18) cites Bowley (1930) as a pioneer of this view, but Bowley (1930: 21-23) himself pointed out how difficult it is to show that any of these wider changes were actually the result of the war and would not have occurred anyway in its absence. Classifying developments as (a) mainly unconnected with the war, (b) accelerated or retarded by it or (c) apparently arising out of it, Bowley was himself reluctant to put anything other than the key elements of the "cost of war" calculations such as loss of life and destruction of capital into category (c). He did mention the new economic relation between Europe and the United States in this category, but with hindsight we can see that the process of US overtaking was already underway well before World War I (Abramovitz, 1986; Broadberry 1998 ).
V. THE IMPACT ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
Wartime destruction and postwar recovery
The neoclassical growth model assumes a diminishing marginal product of capital.
Hence capital destruction should lead to an increase in the marginal product of capital and faster growth during a transitional phase. This suggestion of a negative relationship between the scale of wartime destruction and the subsequent growth rate has previously been quantified in the literature on the post-World War II period, particularly by Janossy (1971) , who used it to predict the end of the postwar economic miracles in Germany and Japan, subsequently borne out by events (Dumke, 1990) .
The relationship has been little discussed in the context of World War I, with the notable exception of a study by Eichengreen (1990) , who pointed to a negative relationship between the growth of industrial production 1921-1927 and the level of industrial production in 1921 relative to its 1913 level in a sample of thirteen industrial countries. The negative relationship can be confirmed using regression analysis. 
Effects on growth over the longer run
Over the longer run, however, there is little doubt that World war I had a negative impact on the growth rate in Europe as a whole. One way of understanding that is through the effects on accumulation. As already noted, the war had a significant negative impact on physical and human capital in the combatant countries. Although there was some rebound, it was not sufficient to undo the damage of the war.
Furthermore, these negative effects on accumulation had a high degree of persistence because of the effects of the war on the institutional framework. Although World War I may be seen as the culmination of a period of existing national rivalry, there can be little doubt that it served to strengthen the forces of nationalism. This can be seen as having serious economic consequences, giving a boost to protectionism and autarkic policies during the 1920s and 1930s.
The consequences of the capital destruction of the war combined with the economic dislocation of its aftermath for the growth of per capita income in Europe and other parts of the world over the longer run can be seen in Table 11 . The first point to note is that growth of per capita GDP for a weighted average of fifteen by Feinstein et al. (1997:8-9) as the destructive impact of World War I, followed by the economic disintegration of the interwar period and the further destruction of World War II. The argument is given added weight by the fact that the impact was much greater in Europe than in the United States, since the war was fought largely on European soil with unprecedented severity, and Europe's economies were more dependent on international economic transactions before 1914. On this interpretation, the period 1950-1973 is best seen as catching-up in a more integrated world economy.
Turning in Table 12 to variation between European countries in the growth rate of GDP during the shorter period 1913-1929, we see that the most important difference is between neutral and combatant countries. The lowest growth rate amongst the neutrals (Sweden) was equal to the highest growth rate amongst the combatants (France). This again supports the emphasis on the costs of war in the traditional literature. Important themes stressed in this literature include the protectionist environment and the general lack of international co-operation over the international monetary system as well as the international trading system (Eichengreen, 1992) . One factor which needs to be mentioned here is the proliferation of independent nation states following the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. This was based on one of the founding principles of the League of Nations, the self-determination of nations. In eastern and central Europe, this led to a proliferation of states with separate currencies and customs jurisdictions. In a less protectionist environment, this may not have been of great significance, but in the context of protectionist interwar Europe, it clearly had serious trade-diverting effects.
Nevertheless, although there was clearly a net effect of economic disintegration in central and eastern Europe, we should not forget that there were also areas of increased integration. Probably of most significance here was the increased integration of the reunited parts of Poland that had previously been partitioned between Prussia, Austria and Russia (Wolf, 2003) .
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have used the experience of the major combatant countries in World War I to analyse the role of economic factors in determining the outcome of the war and the effects of the war on subsequent economic performance. We have shown, first, that the degree of mobilisation for war can be explained largely by differences in the level of development of each country, leaving little room for other factors that feature prominently in narrative accounts, such as national differences in war preparations, war leadership, military organisation and morale. This matches the conclusions of Harrison (1998) that the outcome of World War II was also determined largely by economic factors. For total warfare during the twentieth century, at least, it seems that the outcome of wars can be explained quite simply: in the words of James Carville, managing Bill Clinton's US presidential election campaign in 1992, "It's the economy. Stupid".
We have examined the effects of the war on subsequent economic performance in terms of the scale of destruction of physical and human capital. Here, we defend the basic approach of liberal economists who calculated the costs of the war, but we reinterpret the results within a national balance sheet framework.
Although the growth rate between 1918 and 1929 was highest in the economies which experienced the worst destruction, over the period 1913-1929 as a whole, per capita income growth in Europe was reduced. Thus there was some rebound, but not enough to undo the negative effects of the capital destruction and the damage to the international institutional framework caused by the war. Sources: Populations and territories are from League of Nations (1927: 10-16 Sources: Maddison (1995: 148-51) , except Russia from Gatrell (2005) . Italy is omitted for reasons given in Broadberry (2005) . Sources: Cost data from Bogart (1920: 267) ; Population data from Urlanis (1971: 209) . Source: Bogart (1920: 269-299 Grand total 337,846
Source: Bogart (1920: 269-299 ). Urlanis (1971: 209) . Notes: Battle deaths includes killed in battle, died from wounds and died from poison gas. Non-battle deaths includes died from disease, died in captivity and died from accidents and other causes. Source: Feinstein et al. (1997: 7, 9 ). Feinstein et al. (1997: 13) . Source: Table 4 and Maddison (2001) . Observations from left to right are Russia, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Canada, UK, New Zealand, USA, and Australia. Territories are measured within contemporary frontiers. Currency units are international dollars at 1990 prices. Endnotes 1 Technically speaking, the United States of America never joined Britain and France in a formal Alliance; therefore, the United States was not strictly an "Ally". This had minor consequences for the co-ordination of military strategy in the west, and major consequences for postwar diplomacy and the negotiation of a peace treaty with defeated Germany. For the present paper it is not an important distinction.
2 Those ratios in Table 3 that are comparable with those computed by Ferguson (1998: 248-9) slightly exceed his estimates, the differences being accounted for in part by the quality of his sources which are adequate but less than authoritative. Ferguson gives the ratio of Entente GDPs to GDPs of the Central Powers in 1913 as 1.6:1; our figure is 1.8:1. Ferguson gives the ratio of populations of the two sides, including their colonial possessions, as 4.5:1; our figure is 5.2:1. Whether or not "squandered," therefore, the Allied "advantage" appears undeniable. 7 The relationship is as follows, with t-statistics in parentheses and an R-squared of 0.59: (6.93) (14.63) 11.04 7.68 1918 GDPGrowth GDP = -´
